Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study the effects of demand shocks caused by Emerging Asian (EMA) countries 1 on oil prices over the past two decades. The rapid increase in economic activity and oil consumption of EMA countries, and especially China, has attracted consid- However, correlation is of course not proof of causation. Other factors, related, for example, to the muted supply-side response to higher oil prices have also been assigned a role in the oil market narrative of the past decade. So clearly there is room for empirical analysis to shed light on the issue.
Chart 1 China/EMA oil consumption and oil price
Source: BP (2014) 1 The countries included in the EMA aggregate for the purposes of the current study are China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. that these imports have not been a significant driver of crude oil prices over the sample period (1997 to 2010) , and China's oil demand only played a small role in the oil price rise that occurred prior to the global financial crisis. Niklaus and Inchauspe (2013) also cast doubt on the importance of EMA demand for oil prices, whereas Roache (2012) , using a large VAR model, finds that Chinese demand has had a positive short-term effect on certain commodity prices (including crude oil) between 2002 and 2011. However, the longerterm effects are less relevant than those caused by demand shocks in the US. Overall, based on recent research, the importance of EMA demand for recent oil price dynamics appears to be ambiguous.
The approach taken in the current study differs from other recent empirical studies in the way it handles the EMA oil demand variable. In some of the existing studies (for example, Mu and Ye (2011) ), EMA oil demand is defined in terms of oil consumption data.
In contrast, I make an effort to model EMA oil demand by an oil demand indicator, which is not dependent on oil production and consumption data. By doing this, it should be possible to elicit responses to structural EMA oil demand shocks in a more realistic manner. The results of the study also confirm this. EMA demand shocks have been an important driver of global oil prices over the past two decades. The shocks have led to persistent effects on oil prices, much more so than has been the case for demand shocks emanating from other countries, or supply shocks. EMA demand shocks have also accounted for a significant share of oil price variation. Furthermore, there is tentative evidence for China being the main driver of the EMA demand shocks. These results are robust to alternative specifications of the demand indicator and to an identification strategy based on sign restrictions instead of the conventional Choleski ordering of the variables.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the oil demand indicator used in the model, with special emphasis on the definition of the EMA oil demand varia-ble. Section 3 presents the results of the benchmark VAR analysis, and section 4 the results of an alternative specification based on a sign-restricted VAR. Section 5 concludes.
Oil demand indicator
Typically, a modern benchmark oil-market VAR consists of three variables measuring oil demand, oil supply and oil price. In this type of a VAR, defining the supply and oil price variables is relatively straightforward. As is customary in the literature, the supply of oil is defined as global oil production, and oil price is defined as one of the main benchmark oil prices (typically Brent or West Texas Intermediate (WTI)) deflated by a price index (typically the US Consumer Price Index), to obtain a measure of the real oil price.
In contrast, the definition of oil demand is more elusive. This is because there is no explicit measure available that can capture all the relevant factors affecting the dynamics of oil demand. However, some attempts have been made in the recent literature to define proxy variables for global oil demand. The motivation for designing such variables has been to make a distinction between demand and supply shocks in the oil markets. The pioneering study in this respect is Kilian (2009) , which derives a measure of global commodity demand based on global shipping freight rates. Melolinna (2012) , on the other hand, uses a factor model based on industrial production in emerging markets and the OECD as well as household consumption expenditures on oil to construct an oil demand indicator.
For purposes of the current study, the aim being to analyse the effects of EMA oil demand shocks, one needs a measure of EMA oil demand. To my knowledge, no such measure has been suggested in previous literature. When attempting to identify the effects of Chinese or EMA oil demand shocks, previous studies have usually resorted to oil consumption or net oil imports data as an indicator of oil demand. However, using this kind of a proxy for oil demand is highly problematic. This is because oil supply (global or regional oil production) is linked to oil consumption (global or regional) by an accounting identity; consumption during any given time period must be equal to production plus depletion of inventories. Therefore, it is very difficult to elicit an independent demand shock from the system, as it is not clear whether changes in consumption are linked to changes in demand or are driven by changes in production.
For my model, the aim is to find a general indicator measuring commodity demand that is driven by real economic activity. The approach taken is to use the only avail- Because the viability of the VAR approach requires that the total global oil demand indicator be split into its contributions from the EMA and RoW, the industrial production data have to be weighted by a variable that reflects these relative shares. To complement the EMA demand indicator for oil market dynamics and to take into account the increasingly important role of EMA countries in global commodity (including oil) demand, the relevant industrial production time series are weighted by the share of EMA countries in global oil consumption. This share has been steadily increasing over recent decades, as shown in Chart 2, and these dynamics have been driven largely by oil consumption dynamics in China. Only by allowing the EMA oil demand indicator to account for this feature can one hope to get a realistic picture of the importance of EMA oil demand in recent decades. This choice of the weighting variable is also supported by the fact that the data are timely, readily available and not subject to revisions or exchange rate fluctuations 3 .
2 Based on data published by the US Energy Information Administration, and making certain simplifying assumptions on the consumption purposes of oil, this share has been slightly below 50% for the EMA countries between 1990 and 2010, and declined from approximately 40% to 35% for the RoW. Hence, while the share is lower for the RoW, the differences and changes are relatively small, and are not considered here to be a significant factor in the dynamics of the oil demand indicator. The benchmark EMA oil demand indicator is defined as
and the oil demand indicator for RoW is then calculated as follows:
where emaindic t is the EMA oil demand indicator at month t, emaip t is EMA industrial production index, emaoil t is the share of EMA oil consumption of total world, rowindic t is the RoW oil demand indicator and worldip t is world industrial production. Hence, the EMA demand indicator can be seen as the contribution of EMA countries to world industrial production growth 4 , weighted by the EMA oil consumption share. 4 The y/y growth rates are used in line with previous literature to ensure the stationarity of the time series for the VAR models (see next section). One could argue that the Kilian demand indicator should somehow be taken into account in the EMA/RoW oil demand indicators. For this purpose, a simple alternative demand indicator was also tested in the model. This is derived by first splitting the Kilian indicator into its EMA/RoW-consumption share weighted components:
and
where k1_emaindic t and k1_rowindic t are intermediate indicators for EMA and RoW, and kilian t is the Kilian oil demand indicator. Then, a simple average is taken of the benchmark indicators (1) and (2) and these intermediate indicators:
This is a simple and transparent way of taking account of information in the Kilian indicator in making the split between EMA and RoW oil demand. 
VAR model specification and results
As noted above, the benchmark VAR model used in the analysis includes variables for oil market supply, demand and prices. This means that the model has four variables; monthly change in global oil production (prodmm), the RoW and EMA demand indicators developed above (rowindic and emaindic, respectively) as well as the real oil price (rpo, defined as Brent oil price in USD, deflated by the US CPI). As is conventional in the literature, the variables are included in the model in stationary form. I follow Kilian (2009) and include the production data in monthly changes (as the level data display a strong non-stationary upward trend) and the real price as logarithmic level (see Appendix 1 for data charts). Given the data availability, the sample period is 1992M1 to 2013M12. This is considerably shorter than traditional oil market models for the US economy, but longer than most models in the previous literature on the EMA/Chinese economy.
The following subsections describe the VAR model and its identification strategy, as well as the estimation results in more detail. 
VAR model and identification strategy
The structural form VAR model used to study the effects of oil shocks is
where Y t is an Nx1 vector of endogenous variables (hence, in the benchmark case, N=4), 
The ordering of the variables is largely based on existing literature and can be intuitively justified as follows. The model implies a vertical short-run oil supply curve, since supply can only react to demand shocks with a lag. This restriction is plausible, because oil producers are typically slow to respond to changes in oil market conditions. The RoW and EMA demand shocks are ordered next in the model. Hence, demand in RoW and EMA reacts contemporaneously to oil supply shocks, but not to other, oil-market-specific demand shocks. As shown in the existing literature (see, for example, Kilian (2009)), real activity and commodity demand typically react very sluggishly to oil-market demand shocks, which justifies this restriction. With regard to the ordering of the RoW demand shock before the EMA demand shock, this restriction implies that RoW demand does not react to an EMA demand shock during the same month, whereas EMA demand can react to RoW demand shocks. This is intuitive due to the larger size of the RoW economy compared to EMA, which is also more dependent on economic activity in the RoW. Nevertheless, this restriction is not crucial for the model, and all the results below remain qualitatively similar even if the relative ordering of RoW and EMA demand shocks is reversed. Finally, oil prices are allowed to react contemporaneously to all the shocks in the model, which is intuitive given the speed with which news is incorporated into oil market prices. The fourth, "residual" shock includes, for example, precautionary demand shocks of the type introduced by Kilian (2009) .
Results
The results of the VAR model estimation are presented in Chart 4. The impulse response functions suggest that EMA demand shocks have had a much more positive and persistent effect on oil prices than RoW demand shocks. Furthermore, statistical analysis of the results also shows that EMA demand shocks Granger-cause the real oil price with 95% statistical significance, whereas no such causality can be found for RoW or supply shocks.
These results are at odds with some previous studies (see, for example, Mu and Ye (2011)) and hence suggest that accounting properly for demand variables in an oil market model makes a crucial difference 6 . The results for the supply and oil-market specific demand shocks are consistent with the findings of Kilian (2009) . Oil-specific demand shocks have a large immediate effect on oil price, which is also intuitive given that oil prices can be expected to be driven strongly by shocks affecting the market directly. As also evidenced by Alquist and Kilian (2010) , there are signs of overshooting in oil prices caused by precautionary demand shocks (which would be included in the oil-market-specific demand shock in the current study). Furthermore, the relatively muted response of oil prices to supply shocks is also in line with previous literature, as oil supply disruptions in one part of the world typically tend to generate an increase in supply from other oil producers 7 . would appear that the significant role of EMA oil demand in oil price dynamics is indeed largely due to Chinese oil demand, as the response of oil price to Chinese oil demand shocks account for large proportion of the size of the EMA demand shock in the benchmark model (Chart 5).
Looking at the results in Chart 4, it is perhaps surprising to see that the RoW demand shocks have had such a limited effect on oil prices over the sample period. Given that the RoW -and OECD countries in particular -still accounts for the majority of global oil demand, one would maybe intuitively expect these demand shocks to carry more weight as a driver of global oil prices. One potential explanation for the muted response of oil prices to RoW demand shocks is that oil supply has reacted more to RoW demand shocks than EMA demand shocks, thus limiting the price effect of the former. It is conceivable that due, for example, to historical oil market links and geopolitical considerations, OPEC countries have responded relatively rapidly to unexpected demand shocks in OECD countries and most notably the US. Indeed, there is some tentative evidence that this has been 8 While monthly year-on-year industrial production data for China is available from Chinese statistical authorities, the problem is the timing of the Chinese New Year in January or February of each year. This timing causes large fluctuations in the year-on-year growth rates, which cannot be rectified with normal seasonal adjustment algorithms. The estimations for China in the current study are done with data adjusted by averaging the January and February growth rates for each year. This procedure mitigates the fluctuations, but does not completely eradicate the problem.
the case during the sample period; RoW demand shocks have Granger-caused year-on-year changes in oil production with 99% statistical significance, whereas there is no statistically significant causality between EMA demand shocks and oil production. Therefore, it would appear possible that EMA demand shocks have come as more of a surprise to oil producers than RoW demand shocks, and the reactions of oil producers have been driven more by demand signals received from the RoW -most probably OECD -countries.
It is worth emphasising that the muted response of oil prices to the RoW demand shocks does not imply that the actions of oil market participants in advanced economies have no significance for oil prices. In particular, when considering modern-day oil market dynamics, the importance of oil-specific demand shocks must be kept in mind. As the results of the current and also several previous studies suggest, oil price reacts mostly to shocks specific to oil markets. These markets are to a large extent located in and connected with advanced economies, especially the US, and actions taken by oil market participants, for example in relation to precautionary demand shocks, are still very important drivers of oil price dynamics.
Chart 5 Impulse responses of real oil price to EMA and China demand shocks 
Robustness checks
To study the effects of different assumptions and choices, several robustness checks were carried out on the benchmark model. First, the results are qualitatively robust to changes in the sample period. Most importantly, the results are not dependent on the inclusion of the recent global financial crisis period, as the effect of the EMA demand shock is even more pronounced during the pre-crisis sample period of 1992 to 2007. One interesting experiment would be to split the sample in half to take into account the lesser significance of EMA and China in global oil consumption in the early part of the sample. Unfortunately this leads to very short sub-samples, so no firm conclusions can be drawn regarding the results. Nevertheless, there is tentative evidence in the results from such shorter models for a less significant reaction of oil price to the EMA demand shock in the earlier sample period.
The decision to use oil consumption shares as weights in the demand indicators (equations (1) and (2)) is open to criticism. While the choice is intuitively rational, one might ask why this weighting scheme should be preferred to any other choice. It needs to be kept in mind that the industrial production growth rates need to be weighted with something that allows for the summing to one of the RoW and EMA shares, as the objective is to find the relative contributions of the two regions to the total global demand indicator.
This naturally restricts the choice of variables that can be used as weights in the indicators 9 . One natural option would be to use the shares of RoW/EMA in global (nominal) GDP. This data is available annually from the IMF (although some of the data for 2013 are still based on forecasts), and was used (after interpolating to monthly data) as an alternative for the oil-consumption-based weights in the model. Since the EMA share of global (purchasing power parity weighted) GDP shows a very similar trend to its share of oil consumption, the results of this alternative estimation are virtually unchanged from the benchmark model.
Another potential criticism of the benchmark model is the fact that some proportion of the EMA crude oil demand is derived from an increased demand for end-products by the RoW economies, and hence the demand indicators used in the benchmark model do not capture the "true" source of commodity and oil demand. On the other hand, this criti-cism can be levelled against any basic oil-market model, with which it will inevitably be very difficult to capture the effects of commodity demand driven by final consumption demand. Nevertheless, the benchmark model was modified in an attempt to take into account the true domestic demand for commodities instead of total demand driven by both domestic and export usage. This was done by defining the part of oil consumption used for transport as domestic and the part used for industry as export-driven 10 , then summing the domestic oil consumption data for the EMA and the RoW and using these EMA/RoW weights in the oil demand indicators in equations (1) and (2). Again, the results for the available sample (1992 to 2010) are qualitatively similar to those for the benchmark model, suggesting that final consumption demand for oil in the EMA, and not just indirect EMA demand driven by RoW final demand, has been an important driver of oil prices.
The estimation was also replicated for the alternative demand indicator introduced in equations (5) 
Alternative identification with sign restrictions
To study the robustness of the benchmark results to the model identification scheme, a VAR model analysis based on sign restrictions 11 was also carried out. For this analysis, the four-variable benchmark model is not viable, as it is not possible to make a distinction in the sign restrictions between the RoW and the EMA demand shocks. In other words, restricting the demand indicator reaction to be positive and the oil price reaction also to be positive is not enough to render the RoW/EMA demand shock unique in a statistical sense.
Hence, the following relative demand indicator, based on the demand indicators and industrial production data presented above, is introduced:
where relindic t is the relative indicator, rowoil t is the RoW share in oil consumption and rowip t is the RoW industrial production. In other words, the relative demand indicator
gives the relative importance of EMA compared to RoW in global commodity and oil demand. For time series stability, the monthly change in the indicator is used in the model below. The sign restrictions used in the PSR approach, which are similar in spirit to those used by Kilian and Murphy (2012) , are presented in Table 1 . Oil supply shocks are defined as shocks that cause a cut in production and an increase in the oil price. Relative demand shocks are defined as shocks that cause either an upward or downward reaction in the relative demand indicator (depending on whether demand increases in RoW or EMA), a positive reaction in the oil price, and (if anything), a positive reaction in oil supply. Finally, all other shocks specific to the oil market are included in a residual shock causing an upward reaction to the oil price. For this shock, I am agnostic on the effects on the other two variables, as this shock is not a focal points of the current study. All sign restrictions in the model are forced on the impact period only, although the relevant results are also robust to longer periods. Other details of the model (sample period and lag length) are the same as in the benchmark model. 
Conclusions
The analysis carried out in the current study strongly suggests that EMA demand shocks have had a persistent and statistically significant effect on the level and variation of global oil prices over the past two decades. This result is not consistent with some of the previous literature, but proves that properly accounting for commodity and oil demand in an oil- The study also leaves open some avenues for future research. First, much of the data available for the EMA, and especially China, is not of the same quality or sample length as data for most advanced economies, and so better data coverage would hopefully facilitate future research efforts. Second, the relative roles of emerging and advanced economies in global oil markets and oil price formation requires further work. The current study suggests that as regards the demand for crude oil emanating from the real economy, EMA demand shocks have been much more important drivers of oil price than have RoW demand shocks over the past two decades. There is also tentative evidence of oil producers reacting more strongly to unexpected RoW than EMA demand shocks, which has mitigated the price effects of the former. Clearly, however, there is room for more complex models and different shock identification approaches to further investigate the issue. From a global macroeconomic perspective, the source of final consumption demand ultimately driving commodity demand in emerging economies is a key topic, for which different approaches and data than those used in the current study could be deployed. Oil-specific demand shock
